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a b s t r a c t
A hierarchical key assignment scheme is a method to assign some private information and
encryption keys to a set of classes in a partially ordered hierarchy, in such a way that the
private information of a higher class can be used to derive the keys of all classes lower down
in the hierarchy.
In this paper we design and analyze hierarchical key assignment schemes which are
provably secure and support dynamic updates to the hierarchy with local changes to the
public information and without requiring any private information to be re-distributed.
– We first consider the problem of constructing a hierarchical key assignment scheme
by using as a building block a symmetric encryption scheme. We propose a new
construction which is provably secure with respect to key indistinguishability, requires
a single computational assumption, and improves on previous proposals.
– Then, we show how to construct a hierarchical key assignment scheme by using as
a building block a public-key broadcast encryption scheme. In particular, one of our
constructions provides constant private information and public information linear in
the number of classes in the hierarchy.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The hierarchical access control problem is defined in a scenario where the users of a computer system are organized in a
hierarchy formed by a certain number of disjoint classes, called security classes. Hierarchical structures arise from the fact
that some users havemore access rights than others, and arewidely employed inmany different application areas, including
database management systems, computer networks, operating systems, military, and government communications.
A hierarchical key assignment scheme is a method to assign an encryption key and some private information to each class
in the system. The encryption key will be used by each class to protect its data by means of a symmetric cryptosystem,
whereas, the private information will be used by each class to compute the keys assigned to all classes lower down in the
hierarchy. This assignment is carried out by a Trusted Authority (TA), which is active only at the distribution phase.
Relatedworks.Akl and Taylor [2] first proposed an elegant hierarchical key assignment scheme inwhich each class is assigned
a key that can be used, along with some public information generated by the TA, to compute the key assigned to any class
lower down in the hierarchy. Subsequently, many researchers have proposed different schemes that either have better
performances or allow insertions and deletions of classes in the hierarchy (e.g., [5,4,22,24,28–31]). A detailed classification
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of many schemes in the literature has been provided by Crampton et al. [14], according to several parameters, such as the
memory requirements for public and private information, the complexity of key derivation, the complexity of handling
dynamic updates to the hierarchy, and the resistance to collusive attacks. Despite the large number of proposed schemes,
many of them lack a formal security proof. Atallah et al. [4] first addressed the problem of formalizing security requirements
for hierarchical key assignment schemes and proposed the first provably-secure constructions based on pseudorandom
functions and symmetric encryption schemes. A scheme is provably secure under a complexity assumption if the existence
of an adversary A breaking a scheme is equivalent to the existence of an adversary B breaking the computational assumption
[21]. Atallah et al. [4] proposed two different notions of security for hierarchical key assignment schemes: security against
key recovery and with respect to key indistinguishability. In the key recovery case, an adversary is not able to compute a key
which cannot be derived by the users he has corrupted; whereas, in the key indistinguishability case, the adversary is not
even able to distinguish the key from a random string of the same length. In [15] the Akl–Taylor scheme has been analyzed
according to the definitions in [4]. It has been specified how to choose the public parameters in order to get instances of
the scheme which are secure against key recovery under the RSA assumption. Moreover, it has been shown how to turn the
Akl–Taylor scheme in a construction offering security with respect to key indistinguishability; however such a scheme, is
less efficient than the constructions in [4] and in the present work.
Finally, we mention two primitives related to key assignment schemes: forward-secure pseudorandom bit generators [9]
and key regression schemes [20]. A forward-secure pseudorandom bit generator is a pseudorandom bit generator satisfying
the additional property of forward-security: even if the seed of the generator is exposed, the past pseudorandom values do
not fall into the hands of the adversary. Such a generator produces at each invocation some output bits as a function of a
current state, updates the state, and then deletes the old state. An adversary breaking in at any point gets only the current
state, while is not able to recover any previous state or previous output block. More precisely, the sequence of output blocks
generated prior to the break-in is indistinguishable from a random independent sequence of blocks even if the adversary
holds the current state of the generator. A key regression scheme aims to derive a sequence of temporally related keys from
a current state and to support the revocation of keys shared by users of an encrypted file system. According to [20], a key
regression scheme is a mirror image of a forward-secure pseudorandom bit generator. We point out that both primitives
have the same functionalities of a hierarchical key assignment scheme secure with respect to key indistinguishability when
the access control policy describes a chain of classes (this will be more evident in Section 3).
Our contributions. In this paper we design and analyze hierarchical key assignment schemes which are provably secure
and efficient. We consider security with respect to key indistinguishability, which corresponds to the requirement that an
adversary is not able to learn any information about a key that it should not have access to, i.e., it is not able to distinguish it
from a random string having the same length.We propose two constructions for hierarchical key assignment schemes. Both
constructions support updates to the access hierarchy with local changes to the public information and without requiring
any private information to be re-distributed. The first construction, which is based on symmetric encryption schemes, is
simpler than the one proposed by Atallah et al. [4], requires a single computational assumption, and offers more efficient
procedures for key derivation andkeyupdates. The second construction,which is based on apublic-key broadcast encryption
scheme, allows to obtain a hierarchical key assignment scheme offering constant private information and public information
linear in the number of classes.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we review the definition of hierarchical key assignment schemes. In
Section 3we show how to construct a hierarchical key assignment scheme using as a building block a symmetric encryption
scheme, whereas, in Section 4 we show a construction based on public-key broadcast encryption schemes. In Section 5 we
conclude the paper with a summary of the parameters of the proposed constructions.
2. Hierarchical key assignment schemes
Consider a set of users divided into a number of disjoint classes, called security classes. A security class can represent a
person, a department, or a user group in an organization. A binary relation ≼ that partially orders the set of classes V is
defined in accordance with authority, position, or power of each class in V . The poset (V ,≼) is called a partially ordered
hierarchy. For any two classes u and v, the notation u ≼ v is used to indicate that the users in v can access u’s data. Clearly,
since v can access its own data, it holds that v ≼ v, for any v ∈ V . We denote the accessible set of a class v by Av which
corresponds to the set {u ∈ V : u ≼ v}, for any v ∈ V . The partially ordered hierarchy (V ,≼) can be represented by the
directed graph G∗ = (V , E∗), where each class corresponds to a vertex in the graph and there is an edge from class v to class
u if and only if u ≼ v. We denote by G = (V , E) theminimal representation of the graph G∗, that is, the directed acyclic graph
corresponding to the transitive and reflexive reduction of the graph G∗ = (V , E∗). Such a graph G has the same transitive and
reflexive closure of G∗, i.e., there is a path (of length greater than or equal to zero) from v to u in G if and only if there is
the edge (v, u) in E∗. Aho et al. [1] showed that every directed graph has a transitive reduction which can be computed in
polynomial time and that such a reduction is unique for directed acyclic graphs. In the following we denote by Γ a family
of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies. For example, Γ could be the family of the rooted trees [31], the
family of the d-dimensional hierarchies [6], etc.
A hierarchical key assignment scheme for a family Γ of graphs, corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies, is defined as
follows.
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Definition 1. A hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ is a pair (Gen,Der) of algorithms satisfying the following
conditions:
1. The information generation algorithm Gen is probabilistic polynomial time. It takes as inputs the security parameter 1τ
and a graph G = (V , E) in Γ , and produces as outputs
(a) a private information su, for any class u ∈ V ;
(b) a key ku, for any class u ∈ V ;
(c) a public information pub.
We denote by (s, k, pub) the output of the algorithm Gen on inputs 1τ and G, where s and k denote the sequences of
private information and of keys, respectively.
2. The key derivation algorithm Der is deterministic polynomial time. It takes as inputs the security parameter 1τ , a graph
G = (V , E) in Γ , two classes u, v in V , the private information su assigned to class u and the public information pub, and
produces as output the key kv assigned to class v if v ∈ Au, or a special rejection symbol⊥ otherwise.
We require that for each class u ∈ V , each class v ∈ Au, each private information su, each key kv , each public infor-
mation pubwhich can be computed by Gen on inputs 1τ and G, it holds that
Der(1τ ,G, u, v, su, pub) = kv.
Notice that in Definition 1 we have not specified the structure of the public information pub and of the graph G. In order
to improve the efficiency of key derivation, pub and G could be structured in such a way that, whenever class u performs
key derivation to compute the key of a class v ∈ Au, it does not need to input the algorithm Der with the whole pub and G,
but only with those parts of them involved in the computation.
Evaluation criteria. The efficiency of a hierarchical key assignment scheme is evaluated according to several parameters, such
as the amount of secret data that needs to be distributed to and stored by users, the amount of public data, the complexity of
key derivation, the complexity of key updates due to dynamic changes to the hierarchy or to users revocation, the resistance
to collusive attacks. As regards as the complexity of key derivation, we are interested both in the number and in the type of
operations needed to derive a key. As regards as the complexity of key updates, due to dynamic changes to the hierarchy, we
would like to allow the insertion and deletion of classes or edges in the hierarchy, without requiring the TA to re-distribute
any private information. Moreover, we notice that user revocation from a class necessarily requires the TA to re-distribute
the secret values to the non-revoked users in that class. However, it is desirable that no other private information must be
updated.
Security notions. A hierarchical key assignment scheme must be resistant to collusive attacks. More precisely, for each class
u ∈ V , the key ku should be protected against a coalition of all users in the set Fu = {v ∈ V : u ∉ Av}, corresponding
to all users which are not allowed to compute the key ku. Atallah et al. [4] first introduced two different security goals for
hierarchical key assignment schemes: security with respect to key indistinguishability and security against key recovery.
Security with respect to key indistinguishability formalizes the requirement that the adversary is not able to learn any
information (even a single bit) about a key that it should not have access to, i.e., it is not able to distinguish it from a
random string having the same length. On the other hand, security against key recovery corresponds to the requirement
that an adversary is not able to compute a key that it should not have access to. The notion of key indistinguishability
offers security guarantees that cannot be achieved by schemes whose security relies only upon key recovery. These stronger
security guarantees could be necessary. For example, it is straightforward that the key indistinguishability notion is needed
in the case the data associated to a class are protected by means of a symmetric encryption scheme whose implementation
detailsmake the confidentiality of the ciphertext (or of part of it) depending on the secrecy of only a portion of the encryption
key.
In this paper we only consider security with respect to key indistinguishability. Moreover, we consider a static adversary
STATu which wants to attack a class u ∈ V and which is able to corrupt all users in Fu. We define an algorithm Corruptu
which, on input the private information s generated by the algorithm Gen, extracts the secret values sv associated to all
classes v ∈ Fu.We denote by corr the sequence output by Corruptu(s). Two experiments are considered. In the first one, the
adversary is given the key ku, whereas, in the second one, it is given a random string ρ having the same length as ku. It is the
adversary’s job to determine whether the received challenge corresponds to ku or to a random string. We require that the
adversary will succeed with probability only negligibly different from 1/2.
If A(·, ·, . . .) is any probabilistic algorithm then a ← A(x, y, . . .) denotes the experiment of running A on inputs x, y, . . .
and letting a be the outcome, the probability being over the coins of A. Similarly, if X is a set then x ← X denotes the
experiment of selecting an element uniformly from X and assigning x this value. If w is neither an algorithm nor a set then
x ← w is a simple assignment statement. A function ϵ : N → R is negligible if for every constant c > 0 there exists an
integer nc such that ϵ(n) < n−c for all n ≥ nc .
Definition 2 (IND-ST). Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies, let G = (V , E) be a graph
inΓ , let (Gen,Der) be a hierarchical key assignment scheme forΓ and let STATu be a static adversarywhich attacks a class u.
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Consider the following two experiments:
Experiment ExpIND−1STATu (1
τ ,G) Experiment ExpIND−0STATu (1
τ ,G)
(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ ,G) (s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ ,G)
corr ← Corruptu(s) corr ← Corruptu(s)
d ← STATu(1τ ,G, pub, corr, ku) ρ ← {0, 1}length(ku)
return d d ← STATu(1τ ,G, pub, corr, ρ)
return d
The advantage of STATu is defined as
AdvINDSTATu(1
τ ,G) = |Pr[ExpIND−1STATu (1τ ,G) = 1] − Pr[ExpIND−0STATu (1τ ,G) = 1]|.
The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of IND-ST if, for each graph G = (V , E) in Γ and each u ∈ V , the function
AdvINDSTATu(1
τ ,G) is negligible, for each static adversary STATu whose time complexity is polynomial in τ .
In Definition 2 we have considered a static adversary attacking a class. A different kind of adversary, the adaptive one,
could also be considered. Such an adversary is first allowed to access all public information as well as all private information
of a number of classes of its choice; afterward, it chooses the class it wants to attack. In [7] it has been proven that security
against adaptive adversaries is (polynomially) equivalent to security against static adversaries. More precisely, in [7] a more
general setting, where the lifetime of each key is limited to a given period of time, has been considered. In such a setting,
each class is assigned to a different key for each different period of time. These schemes are called Time-Bound Hierarchical
Key Assignment Schemes (TBHKAS). However, the equivalence between adaptive and static adversaries shown in [7] also
applies to hierarchical key assignment schemes since they can be seen as TBHKAS with a single period of time. Hence, in
this paper we will only consider static adversaries.
3. A construction based on symmetric encryption schemes
In this sectionwe consider the problem of constructing a hierarchical key assignment scheme by using as a building block
a symmetric encryption scheme.
Rationale behind the construction. A simple way to realize a hierarchical key assignment scheme is to set the key ku of each
class u ∈ V equal to its private information su and to assign a public information p(u,v), for each edge (u, v) ∈ E, in such a
way that, the key of class v, is computed as a certain function F of ku and p(u,v), i.e. kv = F(ku, p(u,v)). Such a scheme belongs
to the family of iterative key encrypting key assignment schemes (IKEKAS), defined by Crampton et al. [14], where each user is
required to store a single secret value, corresponding to its key, and |E| values are made public.
Unfortunately, the above simple construction may only achieve security against key recovery whereas it is not secure
with respect to key indistinguishability. Indeed, consider an adversary attacking a class u and corrupting a class v such that
(u, v) ∈ E. The adversary, on input a challenge ρ, corresponding either to the key ku or to a random value, is able to tell if ρ
corresponds to the key ku by simply checking whether the value F(ρ, p(u,v)) corresponds to the key kv held by class v. The
above attack suggests us that in order to define a key assignment scheme secure with respect to key indistinguishability,
the secret key assigned to a class cannot be used to derive the keys assigned to other classes. Thus, we keep the secret key ku
of class u separated by the private information su, whose goal is to enable the users in u to derive the keys associated to the
classes in the accessible set of u. Specifically, we assign each class u ∈ V a private information su, an encryption key ku, and
a public information πu such that ku = F(su, πu); moreover, for each edge (u, v) ∈ E, there is a public value p(u,v), which
allows class u to compute the private information sv held by class v, i.e., sv = F(su, p(u,v)). This allows any user in a class
u to compute the key kv held by any class v lower down in the hierarchy, by performing distG(u, v) + 1 evaluations of the
function F , where distG(u, v) denotes the length of the shortest path between u and v in G.
The idea of decoupling the private information from the secret key, in such a way that the latter results to be
computationally indistinguishable from a random value and the former is used to derive extra private information, has
been also employed in the design of a forward-secure pseudorandom bit generator [9]. In the following we point out the
relationships between a forward-secure pseudorandom bit generator and a hierarchical key assignment scheme. A forward-
secure pseudorandom bit generator is a stateful object. Each state is associated with a private value si and a bit string outi.
Moreover, there is a deterministic algorithm next that on input the value associated to the current state si returns the value
associated to the next state si+1 and a bit string outi, which is indistinguishable from a random string of the same length. A
forward-secure pseudorandombit generator has the same functionality of a hierarchical key assignment scheme securewith
respect to key indistinguishability where the hierarchy is reduced to a chain of classes. Indeed, the i-th state of the generator
can be seen as a class u, whereas, the value si and the bit string outi can be seen as the private information su and the key ku
of that class, respectively. Moreover, the public information pub is empty, whereas, the function F needed for key derivation
is specified by the algorithm next . In order to achieve security with respect to key indistinguishability, the function F must
be chosen in such a way that each adversary who attacks class u is not able to compute the private information su and to
distinguish the key ku from a random string of the same length. In the case of a forward-secure pseudorandom bit generator,
since the states define a chain, the function F which corresponds to the algorithm next may be implemented by means of a
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standard pseudorandom bit generator (PRG), as shown in [9]. Specifically, let PRG : {0, 1}length(si) → {0, 1}length(si)+length(outi),
the next state si+1 corresponds to the first length(si) bits output by PRGwhile the remaining bits form outi.
Our construction, referred in the following as the Encryption Based Construction (EBC), shows a possible instantiation
of the function F that enables to define a scheme secure with respect to key indistinguishability for any acyclic graph. In
particular, the public information p(u,v) corresponds to the encryption of sv with the key su and F is the decryption function
that decrypts p(u,v) with the key su.
Encryption based construction. Before describing more precisely the EBC construction, we first recall the definition of a
symmetric encryption scheme.
Definition 3. A symmetric encryption scheme is a tripleΠ = (K, E,D) of algorithms satisfying the following conditions:
1. The key-generation algorithmK is probabilistic polynomial time. It takes as input the security parameter 1τ and produces
as output a string key.
2. The encryption algorithm E is probabilistic polynomial time. It takes as inputs 1τ , a string key produced byK(1τ ), and a
messagem ∈ {0, 1}∗, and produces as output the ciphertext y.
3. The decryption algorithmD is deterministic polynomial time. It takes as inputs 1τ , a string key produced byK(1τ ), and
a ciphertext y, and produces as output a message m. We require that for any string key which can be output byK(1τ ),
for any messagem ∈ {0, 1}∗, and for all y that can be output by E(1τ , key,m), we have thatD(1τ , key, y) = m.
The Encryption Based Construction is described in Fig. 1.
Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies. Let G = (V , E) ∈ Γ and let Π = (K, E,D) be a
symmetric encryption scheme.
Algorithm Gen(1τ ,G)
Generation of sequences s and k:
1. For any class u ∈ V , let su ← K(1τ ) and ku ← {0, 1}τ ;
Generation of sequence pub:
2. For any two classes u, v ∈ V such that (u, v) ∈ E, compute the public value p(u,v) = Esu (sv);
3. For any class u in V , compute the public value πu = Esu (ku);
Algorithm Der(1τ ,G, u, v, su, pub)
1. Consider a path (w0, w1), . . . , (wm−1, wm) ∈ E, from u = w0 to v = wm.
For any i = 1, . . . ,m, extract the public value p(wi−1,wi) from pub and compute the private information swi = Dswi−1 (p(wi−1,wi));
2. Extract the public value πv from pub and output the key kv = Dsv (πv).
Fig. 1. The Encryption Based Construction (EBC).
The EBC associates a public value p(u,v) to each edge (u, v) ∈ E, as well as a public value πu to each class u ∈ V . In order
to simplify the analysis of the scheme, in the following we consider the public value πu as it were associated to an additional
edge connecting the class u to a dummy class u′. This will enable us to consider all public information as values associated
to the edges of a hierarchy. Fig. 2 illustrates a partially ordered hierarchy along with the public information associated by
the EBC to the edges of the hierarchy, as well as those associated to additional edges, which are represented by dashed lines.
3.1. Analysis of the scheme
In this section we first show that the security property of the EBC depends on the security property of the underlying
encryption scheme. Afterward, we evaluate the performances of the EBC with respect to several parameters, such as
space requirements for public and private information storage and computational requirements for key derivation and key
updates.
Before analyzing the security of the EBCwe first need to define what wemean by a secure symmetric encryption scheme.
We formalize security with respect to plaintext indistinguishability, which is an adaption of the notion of polynomial security
as given in [21]. We consider an adversary A = (A1, A2) running in two stages. In advance of the adversary’s execution,
a random key key is chosen and kept hidden from the adversary. During the first stage, the adversary A1 outputs a triple
(x0, x1, state), where x0 and x1 are two messages of the same length, and state is some state information which could be
useful later. One message between x0 and x1 is chosen at random and encrypted to give the challenge ciphertext y. In the
second stage, the adversary A2 is given y and state and has to determine whether y is the encryption of x0 or x1. Informally,
the encryption scheme is said to be secure with respect to a non-adaptive chosen plaintext attack, denoted by IND-P1-C0
in [27], if every polynomial-time adversary A, which has access to the encryption oracle only during the first stage of the
attack and has never access to the decryption oracle, succeeds in determining whether y is the encryption of x0 or x1 with
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Fig. 2. A partially ordered hierarchy along with the public information associated by the EBC.
Fig. 3. A topological sorting of the classes in Iu and corresponding sequence of edges.
probability only negligibly different from 1/2. In an adaptive chosen plaintext attack the adversary is also allowed to access
the encryption oracle during the second stage of the attack. Notice that security with respect to such an attack has been
shown to be equivalent to security with respect to a non-adaptive chosen plaintext attack in [27], thus in this paper we will
only consider security with respect to [IND-P1-C0].
Definition 4 (IND-P1-C0). Let Π = (K, E,D) be a symmetric encryption scheme and let τ be a security parameter. Let
A = (A1, A2) be an adversary that has access to the encryption oracle only during the first stage of the attack and has never
access to the decryption oracle. Consider the following two experiments:




key ← K(1τ ) key ← K(1τ )
(x0, x1, state)←AEkey(·)1 (1τ ) (x0, x1, state)←AEkey(·)1 (1τ )
y←Ekey(x1) y←Ekey(x0)
d ← A2(1τ , y, state) d ← A2(1τ , y, state)
return d return d
The advantage of A is defined as
AdvIND−P1−C0Π,A (1
τ ) = |Pr[ExpIND−P1−C0−1Π,A (1τ ) = 1] − Pr[ExpIND−P1−C0−0Π,A (1τ ) = 1]|.
The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of IND-P1-C0 if the advantage function AdvIND−P1−C0Π,A (1τ ) is negligible, for any
adversary Awhose time complexity is polynomial in τ .
Theorem 1. If the encryption schemeΠ = (K,D, E) is secure in the sense of IND-P1-C0, then the EBC is secure in the sense
of IND-ST.
Proof. Let G = (V , E) be a graph in Γ , let u ∈ V and let Gu = (Iu, Eu) be the subgraph of G induced by the set of vertices
Iu = {v ∈ V : there is a path from v to u in G}. W.l.o.g., let (u1, . . . , um), where um ≡ u, be any topological ordering of the
vertices in Iu and let (e1, . . . , eh−1) be the sequence of edges in Eu such that ei = (ua, ub) precedes ej = (uc, ud) if and only
if either a < c or a = c and b < d. Moreover, let eh = (u, u′) (see Fig. 3).
Let STATu be a static adversary attacking class u. In order to prove the theorem, we need to show that the adversary’s
views in experiments ExpIND−1STATu and Exp
IND−0
STATu are indistinguishable. Notice that the only difference between Exp
IND−1
STATu and
ExpIND−0STATu is the last input of STATu, which corresponds to the real key ku in the former experiment and to a random value
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Fig. 4. The left hand side illustrates Exp3u while the right hand side illustrates Exp
4
u .
chosen in {0, 1}τ in the latter. Thus, while in ExpIND−1STATu the public information is related to the last input of STATu, in ExpIND−0STATu
it is completely independent on such a value. For ease of exposition, we define the following experiment:
Experiment Expu(1τ ,G)
(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ ,G)
corr ← Corruptu(s)
d ← STATu(1τ ,G, pub, corr, αu)
return d
which corresponds either to ExpIND−1STATu , if αu is the real key ku, or to Exp
IND−0
STATu , if αu is a random value in {0, 1}τ .
We will show that the adversary’s view in the experiment Expu is indistinguishable from the adversary’s view in an
experiment Exp∗u where the public information, at the same time, does not carry any information about the key ku and is
independent on the last input of STATu. The experiment Exp∗u is defined as follows:
Experiment Exp∗u(1τ ,G)
(s, k, pub∗)← Gen∗(1τ ,G)
corr ← Corruptu(s)
d ← STATu(1τ ,G, pub∗, corr, αu)
return d
In the algorithm Gen∗ the public value πu associated to class u is computed as the encryption Esu(ρ) of a random value
ρ ∈ {0, 1}τ , instead than the encryption of the key ku, and the public value associated to each edge ei = (ua, ub) ∈ Eu is
computed as the encryption Esua (ri) of a random value ri ∈ {0, 1}τ , instead than the encryption of the private information
sub . Thus, in such an experiment, all public information is independent on the value of the key ku. Moreover, the distributions
of the experiment Expu when STATu is given as last input either the real key ku or a random value in {0, 1}τ are the same.
Indeed, in such an experiment the key ku is just a random value independent on the public and private information in the
adversary’s view.
Now, in order to show that ExpIND−1STATu and Exp
IND−0
STATu are indistinguishable, we only need to show that the adversary’s





indistinguishable from the same experiment Exp∗u which also means that they are indistinguishable from each other.
We construct a sequence of h + 1 experiments Exp1u, . . . , Exph+1u , all defined over the same probability space, where
the first and the last experiments of the sequence correspond to Expu and Exp∗u . In each experiment we modify the way
the view of STATu is computed, while maintaining the view’s distributions indistinguishable among any two consecutive
experiments. For any q = 2, . . . , h, experiment Expqu is defined as follows:
Experiment Expqu(1
τ ,G)
(s, k, pubq)← Genq(1τ ,G)
corr ← Corruptu(s)
d ← STATu(1τ ,G, pubq, corr, αu)
return d
The algorithmGenq used in Expqu(1
τ ,G) differs fromGen for theway part of the public information pubq is computed. Indeed,
for any i = 1, . . . , q − 1, the public values associated to the edge ei = (ua, ub) is computed as the encryption Esua (ri) of a
random value ri ∈ {0, 1}τ , instead than the encryption of the private information sub .
Fig. 4 illustrates two consecutive experiments on the hierarchy of Fig. 3.
In the following we show that, for any q = 1, . . . , h, the adversary’s view in the q-th experiment is indistinguishable
from the adversary’s view in the (q+ 1)-th one.
Assume by contradiction that there exists a polynomial-time distinguisher Bq which is able to distinguish between the
adversary STATu’s views in experiments Expqu and Exp
q+1
u with non-negligible advantage. Notice that such views differ only
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for the way the public information associated to the edge eq = (a, b) is computed. We show how to construct a polynomial-
time adversary A = (A1, A2) which uses Bq to break the security of the encryption schemeΠ = (K, E,D) in the sense of
IND-P1-C0. In particular, the algorithm A1, on input 1τ , randomly chooses two messages x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}τ and associates x1
either to the key ku, if (a, b) = (u, u′), or to the private information sb, otherwise. All other keys and private information are
chosen at random. Moreover, A1 constructs all public values associated to the outgoing edges of class a, with the exception
of the edge (a, b), making queries to the encryption oracle Esa(·). The sequences s, k, and pub′ of all private information, keys,
and public values constructed by A1, along with the values x0 and x1 are saved in the state information state. Formally, the
algorithm A1 is defined as follows:
Algorithm AEsa (·)1 (1τ )
x0, x1, ka ← {0, 1}τ
for each class v ∈ V \ {a}
sv ← K(1τ ), kv ← {0, 1}τ
if (a, b) = (u, u′) then ku ← x1
else sb ← x1
for each edge (a, v) ≠ (a, b)
p(a,v) ← Esa (sv)
pub′ ← public values constructed above
state ← (s, k, pub′, x0, x1)
return (x0, x1, state)
Let y be the challenge for the algorithm A, corresponding to the encryption of either x0 or x1 with the unknown key sa.
The algorithm A2, on input 1τ , y, and state, constructs the view for the distinguisher Bq as follows: it first extracts from s the
private information corr held by corrupted users, by using the algorithm Corruptu(s). Then, it computes the public values
not included in pub′, in order to obtain the sequence pub. In particular, the public value associated to the edge eq = (a, b) is
set equal to the challenge y. Finally, A2 outputs the same output as Bq(1τ ,G, pub, corr, x1). More formally,
Algorithm A2(1τ , y, state)
let state = (s, k, pub′, x0, x1)
corr ← Corruptu(s)
//construction of missing public values
if (a, b) = (u, u′) then πu ← y
else p(a,b) ← y
for each edge (v, z) ∉ {e1, . . . , eq}
p(v,z) ← Esv (sz)
for i = 1, . . . , q− 1
ri ← {0, 1}τ
let ei = (v, z)
p(v,z) ← Esv (ri)
for each edge (v, v′) ≠ (a, b)
πv ← Esv (kv)
d ← Bq(1τ ,G, pub, corr, x1)
return d
Notice that if y corresponds to the encryption of x1, then the random variable associated to the adversary’s view is exactly
the same as the one associated to the adversary view in experiment Expqu, whereas, if y corresponds to the encryption of x0,
it has the same distribution as the one associated to the adversary’s view in experiment Expq+1u . Therefore, if the algorithm
Bq is able to distinguish between such views with non-negligible advantage, it follows that algorithm A is able to break the
security of the encryption schemeΠ = (K, E,D) in the sense of IND-P1-C0. Contradiction.
Hence, for any q = 1, . . . , h, the adversary’s view in the q-th experiment is indistinguishable from the adversary’s view
in the (q+ 1)-th one. Therefore, the adversary’s views in experiments Expu and Exp∗u are indistinguishable. This concludes
the proof. 
The EBC requires |E| + |V | public values; on the other hand, each class has to store a single secret value, corresponding
to its private information. As for key derivation, a class u ∈ V which wants to compute the key held by a class v ∈ Au is
required to perform distG(u, v)+ 1 decryption operations.
Notice that the number of decryption operations needed for key derivation could be reduced at the expense of an
increment of the amount of public information. The idea behind the construction, referred in the following as the modified
EBC, is to add the value Esz (kv) to the public information pub, for any edge (z, v) ∈ E. This allows any user in a class u ∈ V to
compute the key held by a class v ∈ Au by performing distG(u, v) decryption operations. Indeed, consider the shortest path
from u to v and let z be the direct predecessor of v on such a path; it follows that distG(u, z) = distG(u, v)− 1 decryptions
are needed to compute the private information held by z, whereas, one decryption is needed to obtain kv from the public
value Esz (kv). However, the modified EBC requires 2|E| + |V | public values. Regarding as the security of the scheme, it is
easy to see that the same technique used in Theorem 1 can be used to prove that the modified EBC is secure in the sense of
IND-ST.
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Fig. 5. A partially ordered hierarchy along with the public information associated by the DEBC.
Finally,we notice that the techniquewehave used to turn the simple encryption based schemedescribed at the beginning
of Section 3 into the EBC could be used as well to turn some other IKEKAS offering security against key recovery in schemes
which guarantee security in the sense ofIND-ST. For example, one could use such a technique starting from the construction
based on pseudorandom functions proposed by Atallah et al. [5,4].
3.2. Handling dynamic changes
In this section we address the problem of managing changes both to the hierarchy, such as additions and deletions of
classes and edges, and to the authorization policy, such as the revocation of a user from a class.
Our goal is to support dynamic changes by means of only local updates to the public information without re-distributing
private information to the classes affected by such changes. Unfortunately, the EBC does not support user revocation or
deletions of classes and edges in the hierarchy without re-distributing private information. Indeed, whenever an edge (u, v)
is removed from E or users are revoked from class u, the private information held by any class lower down u needs to be
changed, since users in class u already had the chance to compute it. Clearly, the need of re-distributing private information
is due to the fact that the EBC allows users of a class to compute the private information of the classes lower down in the
hierarchy.
However, it is possible to modify the EBC in such a way that the private information of each class remains known only
to the users in that class. This is achieved by our construction, referred in the following as the Dynamic Encryption Based
Construction (DEBC), by extending the EBC in such away that each class u is associated to an extra value ηu and an extra public
information corresponding to the encryption with su of the value ηu. Graphically, as shown in Fig. 5, the public information
Esu(ηu) could be considered as it were associated to an additional edge connecting a dummy node u
′′ to the class u; the
public information associated to the solid edges represents that generated by the EBC (see also Fig. 2) with the exception
that each occurrence of the private information su is replaced with the new value ηu.
Notice that, ηu does not belong to the private information. The only private information is su which along with Esu(ηu)
enable to compute ηu. Once obtained ηu, all the keys associated to the classes in Au may be computed. It is easy to see that
a user in a class u is not able to compute the private information sv of any other class v.
The Dynamic Encryption Based Construction is described in Fig. 6.
The scheme requires |V | additional public values and allows any user in a class u to compute the key kv held by any class
v ∈ Au, by performing distG(u, v)+ 2 decryptions.
Notice that the graph obtained by adding the dummy nodes and the extra edges is still an acyclic graph. Thus, the same
technique used in Theorem 1 can be used to prove that the DEBC is secure in the sense of IND-ST.
The DEBC allows to manage each update to the hierarchy and to the authorization policy with only local changes to the
public information. Next we give details about the tasks the TA has to perform to manage each dynamic change.
Insertion of an edge. Let (u, v) be an edge to be inserted in E. Such an update can be managed by the TA by adding the
public value p(u,v) = Eηu(ηv) to the public information pub.
Deletion of an edge. Let (u, v) be an edge to be deleted from E. In order to forbid users belonging to class u from computing
any key which can be computed by class v, for any z ∈ Av , the TA has to choose a new key kz ∈ {0, 1}τ and a new
value ηz ← K(1τ ), whereas, there is no need to change the private information sz . On the other hand, in order to
allow authorized users to compute such new values, the TA has to update the public information pub, as follows:
for any z ∈ Av , it first recomputes the public values ωz = Esz (ηz) and πz = Eηz (kz); then, for any edge (w, z) ∈ E,
it recomputes the public value p(w,z) = Eηw (ηz).
Insertion of a class. Let u be a class to be inserted in V along with new incoming and outgoing edges. First, the TA computes
a private information su, a key ku and a value ηu for class u. Afterward, it computes ωu = Esu(ηu) and πu = Eηu(ku)
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Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies. Let G = (V , E) ∈ Γ and let Π = (K, E,D) be a
symmetric encryption scheme.
Algorithm Gen(1τ ,G)
Generation of sequences s and k:
1. For any class u ∈ V , let su ← K(1τ ) and ku ← {0, 1}τ ;
Generation of sequence pub:
2. For any class u ∈ V , let ηu ← K(1τ );
3. For any two classes u, v ∈ V such that (u, v) ∈ E, compute the public value p(u,v) = Eηu (ηv);
4. For any class u in V , compute the public value ωu = Esu (ηu) and πu = Eηu (ku);
Algorithm Der(1τ ,G, u, v, su, pub)
1. Extract the public information ωu from pub and compute the intermediate key ηu = Dsu (ωu).
2. Let (w0, w1), . . . , (wm−1, wm), wherew0 = u andwm = v, be a path from u to v.
For any i = 1, . . . ,m, extract the public value p(wi−1,wi) from pub and compute the value ηwi = Dηwi−1 (p(wi−1,wi));
3. Extract the public value πv from pub and output the key kv = Dηv (πv).
Fig. 6. The Dynamic Encryption Based Construction.
and adds them to the public information pub. Finally, the TA adds the edges by using the above procedure for edge
insertions.
Deletion of a class. Let u be a class to be deleted from V . For each edge outgoing from v, the TA uses the above procedure
for edge deletions. Afterward, the TA deletes from pub the public information associated with all incoming edges
of u along with the values πu and ωu.
Key replacement. Whenever it is necessary to replace the key assigned to a class u ∈ V , the TA only needs to choose a new
key ku in {0, 1}τ and update the public value πu = Eηu(ku).
User revocation. Whenever a user in a class u ∈ V needs to be revoked, the TA first has to choose a new secret information
su, which is then distributed to each non-revoked user in class u (this is the only re-distribution of secret values).
Then, the TA also has to choose a new key kv and a new value ηv , for each class v in Au. Such values are needed to
compute the new public values ωu = Esu(ηu) and πv = Eηv (kv), for each v ∈ Au, as well as the public information
associated to the u’s incoming edges and the public information associated to all paths starting from u.
The DEBC requires |E|+2|V | public values; on the other hand, each class has to store a single secret value, corresponding
to its private information. As for key derivation, the number of decryption operations required by a class u ∈ V to compute
the key held by a class v ∈ Au is distG(u, v)+ 2.
Notice that the number of decryption operations needed for key derivation could be reduced at the expense of an
increment of the amount of public information. The idea behind the construction, referred in the following as the modified
DEBC, is to add the values Esu(ηw) and Eηz (kv) to pub, for any (u, w) ∈ E and (z, v) ∈ E. This allows any user in a class u ∈ V
to compute the key held by a class v ∈ Au by performing distG(u, v) decryption operations. However, the modified DEBC
requires 3|E| + 2|V | public values.
In the following we compare the DEBC with the scheme proposed by Atallah et al. [4] with respect to the number of
operations needed to perform dynamic updates to the hierarchy. In their scheme, the insertion of an edge requires the TA to
perform one pseudorandom evaluation and two encryption operations, whereas only one encryption operation is required
in the DEBC. Regarding as the deletion of an edge (u, v) ∈ E, the scheme in [4] requires the TA to choose a new label
and to perform 2 · |Av| pseudorandom function evaluations, as well |Xz | pseudorandom function evaluations and 2 · |Xz |
encryption operations, where Xz = {w ∈ V : (w, z) ∈ E}. On the other hand, in the DEBC the TA has to choose two new
values and to perform 2 · |Av| encryption operations, as well as |Xz | encryption operations. For the insertion of a class u,
alongwith its incoming and outgoing edges, the scheme in [4] requires the TA to generate two randomvalues and to perform
two pseudorandom function evaluations, whereas, in the DEBC the TA has to choose three new values and to perform two
encryption operations. In both schemes the deletion of a class reduces to the execution of the procedure for the deletion
of each outgoing edge from the deleted class. Moreover, both schemes also use the procedure for edge insertions, for each
incoming and outgoing edge. For the revocation of a user from a class u, both schemes require to re-distribute the private
information su and to perform the same operations required to delete the class. Moreover, the scheme in [4] also requires to
perform two additional pseudorandom function evaluations, whereas the DEBC requires to choose two new values and to
perform two encryption operations. As for the key replacement of a class u, the DEBC only requires to choose a new value
and to perform an encryption operation, whereas, the scheme in [4] not only requires all computations needed to perform
a user revocation but also requires to choose a new private information for class u and to re-distribute it to the users in u.
Finally, we notice that the techniquewe have used to turn the EBC into the DEBC could be used aswell to turn some other
IKEKAS, which do not allow dynamic updates to the hierarchy without re-distributing any private information, in schemes
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Diameter Minimal number
ℓ of shortcut edges
1 Θ(n2)
2 Θ(n · log n)
3 Θ(n · log log n)
4 Θ(n · log∗ n)
O(log∗ n) Θ(n)
Fig. 7.Minimal number of shortcut edges to be added to chains and trees with n vertices in order to obtain a shortcut graph with diameter ℓ.
which allow such updates with local changes to the public information only. For example, one could use such a technique
starting from the construction based on pseudorandom functions proposed by Atallah et al. [5,4].
3.3. Improving key derivation time
In both schemes described in Section 3, as well as in those proposed by Atallah et al. [4], the number of steps that a class u
has to perform, in order to compute the key of another class v lower down in the hierarchy, is bounded below by the length
of the shortest path from u to v. Atallah et al. [4–6] and De Santis et al. [16] analyzed the problem of reducing key derivation
time by modifying the graph representing the hierarchy, in order to reduce its diameter, where the diameter of a directed
graph G = (V , E) is defined as the maximum distance between a pair of vertices in V connected by a path. To this aim, they
proposed some constructions to add additional edges, called shortcut edges, as well as dummy vertices, to the hierarchy.
The shortcutting technique. The shortcutting of a directed graph G = (V , E) consists into inserting additional edges, called
shortcut edges, in E without changing the transitive closure ofG. The goal is to obtain another directed graph, called a shortcut
graph, having a smaller diameter than G. The shortcutting technique is quite old, indeed it has been first considered in 1982
by Yao [34]. In particular, he considered the problem in a quite different context, where the n elements of V belong to a
given semigroup (S, ◦) and one is interested in answering queries of the form ‘‘what is the value of vi ◦ vi+1 ◦ · · · ◦ vj−1 ◦ vj?’’
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n. In the following we translate to our scenario the main existing results concerning the shortcutting
technique when applied to particular kinds of graphs. We start discussing chains, then we analyze trees and finally general
graphs.
Chains. By using the techniques proposed by Yao [34] we can add shortcut edges to a chain (v1, . . . , vn) of n vertices. The
techniques proposed by Alon and Schieber [3] in 1987 and Bodlaender et al. [10] in 1994 are essentially the same as the
ones proposed by Yao, but their description is easier to illustrate. The details of the constructions, translated to our scenario,
can be found in [16]. The parameters of such constructions are summarized in Fig. 7, where log∗ n, is the iterated logarithmic
function.
Trees. In 1987 Chazelle [13], as well as Alon and Schieber [3], considered the problem of reducing the diameter of free trees,
i.e., indirected connected acyclic graphs, by adding shortcut edges. Their results, which are summarized in Fig. 7, were also
shown to hold for directed trees [33].
General Graphs. Thorup [32] conjectured that for any directed graph G = (V , E) one can obtain a shortcut graph with
diameter polylogarithmic in |V |, i.e., (log |V |)O(1), by adding at most |E| shortcut edges. He also showed his conjecture to
be true for planar directed graphs [33]. However, Hesse [23] gave a counterexample to Thorup’s conjecture. He showed
how to construct a direct graph with |E| = Θ(|V |19/17) edges that requires the addition of Ω(|E| · |V |1/17) to reduce its
diameter belowΘ(|V |1/17). By extending his construction, Hesse [23] also showed how to obtain graphs with |V |1+ϵ edges
that require the addition ofΩ(|V |2−ϵ) shortcut edges to reduce their diameter belowΩ(|V |δ), for some 0 < ϵ < 1/4 and
0 < δ < 1.
All constructions described in this section can be used to reduce key derivation time in the hierarchical key assignment
scheme described in Section 3, as well as in those proposed by Atallah et al. [4]. However, the result by Hesse [23] implies
that, for some kinds of graphs, the number of shortcut edges required to decrease the diameter of the graph significantly
cannot be reduced essentially belowΩ(|V |2).
The shortcutting and point-inserting technique. Atallah et al. [6,4] also proposed a different technique to reduce the diameter
of an access hierarchy. Such a technique consists of the addition of dummy vertices, as well as new edges, to the hierarchy.
The addition of dummy vertices results in a smaller number of new edges to be added to the hierarchy. The techniquemakes
use of the concept of dimension of a poset, originally defined by Dushnik and Miller [19]. The dimension of a poset (V ,≼)
is the minimum number of total orders on V whose intersection is (V ,≼). It can also be seen as the smallest nonnegative
integer d for which each u ∈ V can be represented by a d-vector (xu,1, . . . , xu,d) of integers such that v ≼ u if and only if
xv,i ≤ xu,i, for any i = 1, . . . , d, and any u, v ∈ V . There are efficient algorithms to test if a poset has dimension 1 or 2, but
the problem of determining if a poset has dimension 3 is NP-complete. A poset has dimension one if and only if it is a total
order.
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ℓ ♯ shortcuts in [4] ♯ shortcuts in [16] diam. in [4] diam. in [16]
1 O(n2d(log n)d−1) O(n2d(3 log n)d−1) 2d− 1 1
2 O(nd(log n)d) O(nd(3 log n)d) 2d 2
3 O(nd(log n)d−1 log log n) O(nd(3 log n)d−1 log log n) 2d+ 1 3
4 O(nd(log n)d−1 log∗ n) O(nd(3 log n)d−1 log∗ n) 2d+ 2 4
O(log∗ n) O(nd(log n)d−1) O(nd(3 log n)d−1) 2(d− 1)+ O(log∗ n) O(log∗ n)
Fig. 8. Summary of parameters of the techniques proposed in [4] and in [16].
The technique in [6,4] is recursive, and for the base case d = 1 reduces to the construction proposed by Yao, whose
parameters are summarized in Fig. 7. Such a result has been later improved in [16] by performing a further shortcutting of
the graph obtained by Atallah et al.’s technique, in order to allow key derivation time to be independent on d. Compared to
the technique in [6,4], the technique in [16] allows a further reduction of the diameter, but in each recursive call, it adds at
most three times the number of new edges added by that algorithm. Fig. 8 summarizes the parameters of the techniques in
[6,4,16].
4. A construction based on broadcast encryption schemes
In this section we show how to construct a hierarchical key assignment scheme using as a building block a broadcast
encryption scheme. A broadcast encryption scheme allows a sender to broadcast an encrypted message to a set of users in
such a way that only legitimate users can decrypt it. Broadcast encryption schemes can be either public-key or symmetric-
key based. In the symmetric-key setting, only a trusted authority can broadcast data to the receivers. In contrast, in the
public-key setting a public key published by a trusted authority allows anybody to broadcast a message. Although it is
possible to construct key assignment schemes starting from symmetric-key broadcast encryption schemes, we analyze
the public-key setting since the instantiation we provide in Section 4.2 has interesting performances. We first recall the
definition of a public-key broadcast encryption scheme [12].
Definition 5. A public-key broadcast encryption scheme for a setU of users is a triple of algorithms (Set, Enc,Dec) satisfying
the following conditions:
1. The setup algorithm Set is probabilistic polynomial time. It takes as input a security parameter 1τ and the set of usersU
and produces as output a private key sku, for each user u ∈ U, and a public key pk.
2. The encryption algorithm Enc is probabilistic polynomial time. It takes as inputs 1τ , a subset X ⊆ U, and the public key
pk, and produces as output the pair (Hdr, k), where Hdr is called the broadcast header and k is a encryption key. Let m
be a message to be broadcast in such a way that only users in X are allowed to obtain m and let y be the encryption of
m under the symmetric-key k. The broadcast message consists of (X,Hdr, y), where the pair (X,Hdr) is called the full
broadcast header and y is called the broadcast body.
3. The decryption algorithm Dec is deterministic polynomial time. It takes as inputs 1τ , a subset X ⊆ U, a user u ∈ X and its
private key sku, a broadcast header Hdr , and the public key pk, and produces as output the key k. Such a key can be used
to decrypt the broadcast body y in order to obtainm.
We require that for all subsets X ⊆ U, all users u ∈ X , all public keys and private keys which can be output by Set(1τ ,U),
all pairs (Hdr, k), which can be output by Enc(1τ , X, pk), we have that Dec(1τ , X, u, sku,Hdr, pk) = k.
In the following we show how to construct a hierarchical key assignment scheme using as a building block a public-
key broadcast encryption scheme. The idea behind our construction, referred in the following as the Broadcast Encryption
Based Construction (BEBC), is to compute the private and public information by using the broadcast encryption scheme;
more precisely, the public information will contain a broadcast header Hdru, which corresponds to an encryption of the
key ku, for each class u ∈ V . Such a broadcast header can be decrypted by all classes in the set Iu = {v ∈ V :
there is a path from v to u in G}, allowing them to compute the key ku. The Broadcast Encryption Based Construction is
described in Fig. 9.
4.1. Analysis of the scheme
In this section we first show that the security property of the BEBC depends on the security property of the underlying
broadcast encryption scheme. Afterward, we evaluate the performances of the BEBC with respect to several parameters,
such as space requirements for public and private information storage and computational requirements for key derivation
and key updates.
Before analyzing the security of the BEBC we first need to define what we mean by a secure public-key broadcast
encryption scheme. The security of a public-key broadcast encryption scheme is defined through a game between an
adversary A and a challenger. According to the capabilities of the adversary and the security goal, several types of security
notions for public-key broadcast can be defined. We consider the definition of semantic security given by Boneh et al. [12],
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Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies. Let G = (V , E) ∈ Γ and let (Set, Enc,Dec) be a
public-key broadcast encryption scheme for users in V .
Algorithm Gen(1τ ,G, )
1. Run Set(1τ , V ) to generate a public key pk and a secret key sku for any u ∈ V ;
2. For each class u ∈ V , let su = sku;
3. For each class u ∈ V , run Enc(1τ , Iu, pk) to obtain the pair (Hdru, ku);
4. Let s and k be the sequences of private information and keys computed in the previous two steps;
5. Let pub be the sequence constituted by the public key pk along with the header Hdru, for any u ∈ V ;
6. Output (s, k, pub).
Algorithm Der(1τ ,G, u, v, su, pub)
1. Extract the public key pk and the header Hdrv from pub.
2. Output kv = Dec(1τ , Iv, u, su,Hdrv, pk).
Fig. 9. The Broadcast Encryption Based Construction.
where the adversary is not allowed to issue decryption queries to the challenger. Different notions of security, such as chosen
ciphertext security can be found in [18,12,25]. We consider the following game:
– Initialization. Algorithm A outputs a set X ⊆ U of receivers that it wants to attack.
– Setup. The challenger first runs Set(1τ ,U) to obtain a private key sku for each user u ∈ U and a public key pk. Afterward,
it gives the public key pk and all private keys skv for which v ∉ X to A.
– Challenge. The challenger runs Enc(1τ , X, pk) to obtain (Hdr, k). Then, it picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, sets kb = k and
chooses k1−b as a random key. The challenge (Hdr, k0, k1) is given to A.
– Guess. Algorithm A outputs its guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} for b and wins the game if b = b′.
The advantage of the adversary A is defined as
AdvA,U(1τ ) = |Pr[b′ = b] − 1/2|.
Definition 6. Let (Set, Enc,Dec) be a public-key broadcast encryption scheme for a setU of users. The scheme is said to be
semantically secure if the function AdvA,U(1τ ) is negligible, for any adversary Awhose time complexity is polynomial in τ .
Now we are ready to show that if the public-key broadcast encryption scheme (Set, Enc,Dec) is semantically secure,
then the BEBC is secure in the sense of IND-ST.
Theorem 2. If the public-key broadcast encryption scheme (Set, Enc,Dec) is semantically secure, then the BEBC is secure in the
sense of IND-ST.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that the BEBC is not secure in the sense of IND-ST. Thus, there exists a graph G = (V , E)
in Γ and a class u ∈ V for which there exists a polynomial-time adversary STATu whose advantage AdvINDSTATu(1τ ,G) is non-
negligible. We show how to construct a polynomial-time adversary A which, by using STATu, is able to break the semantic
security of the broadcast encryption scheme used as a building block of the BEBC.
The adversary A first chooses Iu ⊆ V as the set of receivers it wants to attack. Then, it interacts with the challenger,
obtaining the public key pk and the secret keys for all users in V \ Iu. Afterward, it gets the challenge (Hdr, k0, k1) computed
by the challenger. Then, A constructs the inputs for STATu as follows:
– For each class v ∈ V \ {u}, A runs Enc(1τ , Iv, pk) to obtain the pair (Hdrv, kv);
– The public information pub consists of the public key pk along with the header Hdrv , for any v ∈ V , with Hdru set equal
to the challenge Hdr;
– The private information corr held by corrupted users consists of the secret keys for all users in V \ Iu;
– The last input for STATu consists of the key k1 contained in the challenge (Hdr, k0, k1).
Notice that if the last input for STATu is equal to the key k hidden into the header Hdr , then the random variable associated
to STATu’s view is exactly the same as in experiment ExpIND−1STATu (1
τ ,G), whereas, if it is a random string, such a variable has
the same distribution as the one associated to STATu’s view in experiment ExpIND−0STATu (1
τ ,G).
Finally, A outputs the same output as STATu(1τ ,G, pub, corr, k1). It is easy to see that
AdvA,V (1τ ) = AdvINDSTATu(1τ ,G).
Since AdvINDSTATu(1
τ ,G) is non-negligible, it follows that adversary A is able to break the semantic security of the public-key
broadcast encryption scheme. Contradiction. 
Regarding space requirements, the public information pub in the BEBC consists of the public key pk, as well as of a public
header Hdru for each class u ∈ V . Hence, the size of the public information depends on the size of the public key and of
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the header in the underlying public-key broadcast encryption scheme. On the other hand, each class has to store a single
secret value, corresponding to the secret key in the underlying scheme. Moreover, users are required to perform a single
decryption in order to derive a key.
4.2. An efficient construction using bilinear maps
In this section we show how to obtain a broadcast encryption based hierarchical key assignment scheme where the
amount of public information is linear in the number of classes and the private information assigned to each class has
constant size. The idea is to use the BEBC by plugging in the public-key broadcast encryption scheme proposed by Boneh
et al. [12], which is based on a bilinear map between two groups. A function e : G1 × Gˆ1 → G2 is said to be a bilinear map
if: (1) G1 and Gˆ1 are two groups of the same prime order q; (2) For each α, β ∈ Zq, each g ∈ G1, and each h ∈ Gˆ1, the value
e(gα, hβ) = e(g, h)αβ is efficiently computable; and (3) The map is non-degenerate (i.e., if g generates G1 and h generates
Gˆ1, then e(g, h) generates G2). In the following, for simplicity, we focus on symmetric bilinear maps (i.e., such that G1 = Gˆ1).
The m-Bilinear Decisional Diffie–Hellman Exponent Problem (m-BDDHE) in ⟨G1,G2, e⟩, formally introduced in [11], is as
follows: given a tuple (g, h, g1, . . . , gm, gm+2, . . . , g2m, x) ∈ G2m+22 ,where gi = g(αi) for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1,m+ 1, . . . , 2m,
for a randomly chosen generator g of G1, randomly chosen α ∈ Z∗q , h ∈ G1, and x ∈ G2, decide whether x = e(gαm+1 , h). The
m-Bilinear Decisional Diffie–Hellman Exponent Assumption is the assumption that them-BDDHE problem is computationally
hard. Such an assumption holds in generic bilinear groups [11].
Boneh et al. [12] showed how to construct a semantically secure broadcast encryption scheme for a set U of n users,
assuming the intractability of the n-BDDHE problem. In their scheme the private key held by each user consists of a single
group element, the public key contains 2n + 1 group elements, whereas, each broadcast header consists of two group
elements. For a subset X ⊆ U of receivers, time required for a decryption operation will be dominated by |X | − 2 group
operations. However, if a receiver in X has already decrypted a broadcast message for a set of receivers X ′ which is similar to
X , then only |X |−|X ′| group operations are needed. It follows that ifwe use such a public-key broadcast encryption scheme in
the BEBC, we obtain a hierarchical key assignment schemewhere the public information consists of 4|V |+1 group elements,
whereas, the private information has constant size. Finally, key derivation requires a single (complex) decryption operation
(as already discussed before, time required for a decryption operation will be dominated by |V | − 2 group operations).
Notice that, despite the fact that many features (direct key derivation, a single secret value stored by each user, and
public information linear in the number of the classes) are comparable in the BEBC and in the Akl–Taylor scheme [2], the
former scheme satisfies the definition of security with respect to indistinguishability, whereas, the latter does not. Recently,
it has been shown how to construct an Akl–Taylor based scheme offering security with respect to key indistinguishability
[15]; however such a scheme, compared to the BEBC, requires a larger amount of public information and a bigger number
of operations to perform key derivation.
Handling dynamic changes. In this section we show how to manage changes to the hierarchy, such as addition and deletion
of nodes and edges, in such away that no private information held by users need to be re-distributed by the TA. Indeed, such
updates can be handled by local changes to the public information.
Before describing how the updates can be managed by the TA, we notice that the scheme proposed by Boneh et al.
[12] also handles the incremental addition of new users, without restricting a priori the total number of users which can
be managed. However, this involves the distribution of one more private value to each user. Moreover, the scheme also
supports the incremental sharing operation, i.e., the broadcaster may enable new users to decrypt the broadcast message.
Such an addition requires the broadcaster to compute a new header and to remember a secret value associated to such a
header. Now we are ready to discuss how the TA can manage any change to the hierarchy in our construction.
Insertion of an edge. Let (u, v) be an edge to be inserted in E. Such an update, involving the insertion of the class u in the
set Iv , can be managed by the TA by performing the incremental sharing operation offered by the scheme in [12].
Deletion of an edge. Let (u, v) be an edge to be deleted from E. For each class w ∈ Av , the TA recomputes the set Iw and
substitutes the old header Hdrw , contained in the public information pub, with a new one corresponding to a new
key kw . Such a substitution is necessary to forbid users belonging to class u from computing the key of a class w.
The new pair (Hdrw, kw) is obtained by running Enc(1τ , Iw, pk).
Insertion of a class. Let u be a class to be inserted in V along with new incoming and outgoing edges. Such an update can
be managed by the TA by first performing the incremental addition of a new user offered by the scheme in [12],
and then by adding the edges using the above procedure for edge insertions.
Deletion of a class. Let u be a class to be deleted from V . For each edge outgoing from u, the TA uses the above procedure
for edge deletions. Afterward, the TA deletes the header Hdru from pub.
5. Summary of the results
In this paper we have designed and analyzed hierarchical key assignment schemes which are provably secure and
efficient. We have proposed a first construction based on symmetric encryption schemes and a second one using as a
building block a public-key broadcast encryption scheme. Both constructions are provably secure with respect to key
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Scheme Public Private Key Computational
information information derivation assumption
Atallah 2|E|cκ + |V |κ 2 · distG(u, v)+ 1 operations: IND-P1-C0-secure
et al. [4] κ • distG(u, v) decryptions encryption + PRF
• distG(u, v)+ 1 PRF eval.
EBC (|E| + |V |)cκ κ distG(u, v)+ 1 IND-P1-C0-secure
decryptions encryption
Modified (2|E| + |V |)cκ κ distG(u, v) IND-P1-C0-secure
EBC decryptions encryption
DEBC (|E| + 2|V |)cκ κ distG(u, v)+ 2 IND-P1-C0-secure
decryptions encryption
Modified (3|E| + 2|V |)cκ κ distG(u, v) IND-P1-C0-secure
DEBC decryptions encryption
BEBC (4|V | + 1)ν ν One (complex) |V |-BDDHE
decryption
Fig. 10. Summary of parameters of hierarchical key assignment schemeswhich are provably secure in the sense of IND-ST. All schemes, with the exception
of EBC and Modified EBC, support dynamic changes to the hierarchy with local changes to the public information only.
indistinguishability, require a single computational assumption and improve on previous proposals. In particular, one of our
constructions provides constant private information and public information linear in the number of the classes. Moreover,
both schemes support dynamic updates to the hierarchy with local changes to the public information andwithout requiring
any private information to be re-distributed.
Fig. 10 summarizes the parameters of our constructions and of the one proposed by Atallah et al. [4] for a partially
ordered hierarchy G = (V , E). The summary takes into account several parameters, such as the size of the public and private
information, the number and the type of operations required by a class u ∈ V to compute the key of a class v lower down
in the hierarchy, and the computational assumption. In Fig. 10, κ corresponds to the size of the secret key in symmetric
encryption based constructions, whereas, ν denotes the size of a group element in the broadcast encryption scheme by
Boneh et al. [12] ( typically ν ≃ 2κ , according to [26]); the value c is a constant depending on the underlying symmetric
encryption scheme, for instance c is equal to 2 for the so called XOR construction in [8].
Using the constructions proposed in thiswork, new constructions for hierarchical key assignment schemeswith temporal
constraints have been proposed [17]. Such schemes exhibit a tradeoff among the amount of secret data that needs to be
distributed and stored by the users, the amount of public data, the complexity of key derivation, and the computational
assumption on which the security of the scheme is based.
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